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 Abstract 
 
The evidence that distractor processing increases with greater load on working 
memory has come mainly from Stroop-type interference tasks, making it difficult to 
establish whether cognitive load affects distractor processing at the perceptual level or 
during response selection. We measured the Ebbinghaus illusion under varying levels 
of working memory load to test whether cognitive control is also relevant for 
preventing processing of distractors that do not produce any response conflict, and 
instead affect target processing at the perceptual level. The Ebbinghaus illusion was 
greater under high working memory load, suggesting that availability of cognitive 
control functions is critical to reduce distractor processing even for distractors that are 
not associated with a response. We conclude that the effect of loading working 
memory during selective attention leads to greater distractor perception. 
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  The question of the extent to which irrelevant distractors are processed is 
fundamental to the study of selective attention. Load theory of selective attention 
(Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert & Viding, 2004) proposes that two contrasting types of load 
can affect the efficiency of selective attention. Firstly, an increase in the perceptual 
load of the relevant task in displays that also contain to-be-ignored distractors leads to 
a reduction in distractor processing (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997). Secondly, 
in situations where the distractor is likely to undergo processing, such as under low 
perceptual load or for very salient distractors that easily interfere with target 
processing (e.g. distractor faces), cognitive control is necessary to maintain current 
processing priorities by keeping a clear distinction between target-related and 
distractor-related information. Consequently, a reduction in the availability of 
cognitive control mechanisms, due to ongoing or recent engagement of these 
mechanisms in other tasks or processes (i.e. high cognitive control load), is predicted 
to lead to an increase in distractor processing.  
 Evidence indeed supports the notion that the level of distractor processing in 
situations where selective attention to a target is required depends critically on the 
availability of cognitive control mechanisms, which serve to minimize the processing 
of distractor information. When interference effects from irrelevant flanker letters 
were measured under conditions of high working memory load (imposed via a 
separate task), this interference was significantly greater than that found under low 
working memory load conditions (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004; see Lavie, 2005, for review, 
but see Kim, Kim, & Chun, 2005; Park, Kim, & Chun, 2007, for evidence that 
increased load on working memory can also lead to reduced distractor processing 
under certain circumstances).  Findings from neuroimaging have also shown 
modulations of distractor-related processing as a function of working memory load 
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 (De Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2001). Cognitive control functions for which this 
effect on distractor processing has been demonstrated include working memory (De 
Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005, 2006) and dual task coordination 
(Lavie et al., 2004). 
 To date, much of the evidence for the importance of cognitive control 
functions in minimizing distraction has come from Stroop-type tasks, in which greater 
distractor processing is inferred when there is a greater difference in responses to 
targets accompanied by compatible (or neutral) versus incompatible distractors. For 
example, in De Fockert et al. (2001) target names were classified more slowly when 
accompanied with a face from another response category, and this difference was 
significantly modulated by working memory load. Although these findings clearly 
demonstrate that distractors are processed to a greater extent under high working 
memory load, the question remains unanswered as to whether the unavailability of 
working memory for selective attention leads primarily to increased perceptual 
processing of irrelevant information, or primarily to increased response conflict 
because the distractors are associated with a different response to that associated with 
the current target. In other words, are the increased distractor effects observed under 
high working memory load the result of greater distractor perception per se, or does 
loading working memory lead to greater difficulty resolving the response conflict that 
occurs when a response to the irrelevant distractors has to be prevented?  
The neuroimaging evidence that face-specific activity in fusiform gyrus was 
greater under high working memory (De Fockert et al., 2001) load suggests that 
distractors were indeed perceived to a greater extent, however the poor temporal 
resolution of the BOLD signal precludes the exact timing of the effect to be identified 
with confidence. Moreover, since activity in frontal cortex has been associated with 
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 increased response conflict in Stroop tasks (e.g., Van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2001; Mitchell, 2006), it may be that working memory and 
response conflict resolution have shared frontal resources, and that loading working 
memory leads to sub-optimal resolution of the response conflict created by an 
incompatible distractor. Previous behavioural evidence also hints at the possibility 
that increased memory load leads to greater distractor perception. Effects of 
attentional capture by irrelevant singletons tend to be greater under higher memory 
load, even when the distractor is not associated with any response (Lavie & De 
Fockert, 2005; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006). However, attentional capture  
likely also involves cognitive control, especially since the distractors that produce 
attentional capture tend to be highly salient stimuli, so that active control is needed to 
prevent responses to the distractors (Müller, Krummenacher, Geyer & Zehetleitner, 
2008). 
 In order to further address the question whether the observed increase in 
distractor processing results from greater distractor perception or greater response 
conflict, we tested the effect of imposing load on working memory on apparent size 
judgments in Ebbinghaus displays. The Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion is a 
perceptual phenomenon where the apparent size of a central target object is affected 
by the size of surrounding inducers (see Figure 1), so that targets with small inducers 
are perceived as larger than targets with large inducers. We predicted that the 
unavailability of working memory to prevent processing of the inducers would lead to 
an increase in the experience of the illusion. Importantly, any such evidence of greater 
distractor processing cannot be explained in terms of greater response conflict, since 
the Ebbinghaus illusion does not depend on conflict between responses associated 
with the target and the distractor, but rather on the contrast between target and 
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 distractor sizes. Therefore, an increase in the amount of illusion under high working 
memory load cannot be due to less successful resolution of any conflict between 
responses associated with the target and with distractors. In fact, if imposing working 
memory load during processing of Ebbinghaus displays leads to greater likelihood of 
responding to the size of the distractors, rather than the target circle, then high 
working memory load will result in an apparent reduction in the amount of illusion 
experienced. Thus, greater response conflict will lead to more responses being made 
to the target with the large inducers (i.e., less illusion), whereas greater perception of 
the distractors will lead to more responses to the target with small inducers (i.e., more 
illusion). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ten students from Goldsmiths were tested individually in exchange for course credit. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was conducted on a PC running e-prime software (Schneider, 
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002). Ebbinghaus stimulus configurations were presented in 
black on a white background and consisted of two target circles in horizontal 
orientation, one surrounded by large inducing stimuli and one surrounded by small 
inducing stimuli (see Figure 1). The centre-to-centre distance between the target and 
each inducer subtended 4.2° of visual angle for the large inducers and 2.1° for the 
small inducers. The centre-to-centre distance between the inducers subtended 4.8° for 
the large inducers and 1.6° for the small inducers. In the small inducers configuration, 
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 inducers were presented with a diameter subtending 0.5°, and the size of the central 
target circle remained constant at 2.4° diameter. In the large inducers configuration, 
inducers were presented with 4.2° diameter, and the target diameter ranged from 2.2° 
to 2.9°, with 0.1° steps. Thus, relative to the target in the small inducers condition of 
2.4°, the size of the target circle in the large inducers condition was 92%, 96%, 100%, 
104%, 108%, 112%, 116%, and 120%, respectively. The asymmetry in the stimulus 
set makes use of the fact that a reverse illusion does not occur (large inducers will 
never produce the illusion of a larger target). It also has the advantage that the middle 
stimulus is not the veridical. Thus, neither random performance nor any strategy 
based on the range of target sizes in the large inducers condition will lead to veridical 
performance.  
 For the working memory task, memory sets contained either one (low working 
memory load) or six digits (high load) between 1 and 9. The order of the six digits in 
the high load memory set was random, with the constraint that no more than two 
digits were presented in sequential order. For the memory probe, one digit was 
presented in the centre followed by a question mark. Probe digits were equally likely 
to be present or absent in the trial set and equally likely to probe any of the six 
possible memory set positions in the trials of high working memory. In addition, 
probe condition (present or absent) was counterbalanced across trials so that it was 
equally likely to follow each of the 16 (eight target size differences, with large 
inducers either on the left or on the right) possible Ebbinghaus displays. Eighty trials 
were created for each condition of working memory load according to these 
specifications, with five repetitions of each Ebbinghaus display. 
 
Procedure 
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 Each participant first completed four blocks of 12 practice trials each, two 
blocks with low memory load and two with high memory load. The first two blocks 
(one low and one high memory load) were without inducer circles, and participants 
were instructed to indicate which circle was greater (the one on the left or the right) 
by making a key press with either the left or right index finger. The last two practice 
blocks (again one low and one high memory load) were with inducer circles. After 
training, participants were presented with four experimental blocks of 40 test trials 
each, two blocks for each working memory load condition (order counterbalanced 
across participants). Each trial started with a blank screen for 1000ms, followed by 
the memory set of one (low load) or six (high load) digits presented for 1500 ms. 
Participants were instructed to try and remember all the digits in the set until the end 
of the trial. After a 1000ms retention interval, the Ebbinghaus display was presented 
until a response was recorded. On each presentation of the two stimulus 
configurations, participants were asked to choose the target circle they thought was 
the larger by making a key press with either the left or right index finger. Participants 
received no feedback on the accuracy of this response. Both within each block and 
within each target size in the large inducers configuration, the small inducers target 
was equally likely to occur on the left or on the right of the display. Following the 
response to the Ebbinghaus display, there was a 1000ms blank interval, after which 
the memory probe was presented until a response was recorded. Participants were 
instructed to make a left index key press when they thought the memory probe was 
part of the set for that trial, and a right key press when they thought it was not. 
Accuracy feedback to the memory probe response was given in the form of tone 
following incorrect responses. Viewing distance was approximately 60 cm.  
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 =================== 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
=================== 
 
Results 
 
Data from one participant, who misunderstood the instructions and responded 
to the size of the inducers rather than the target circle, was excluded. For the 
remaining nine participants, responses to the memory probe digit were less accurate 
under high memory load compared to low load (mean accuracy .89 vs .94, t(8) = 2.36, 
SEM = .023, p < .05), as well as slower (mean latency 1287 ms vs 1032 ms, t(8) = 
2.12, SEM = 119.8, p < .05), confirming that our memory manipulation was 
successful in increasing load on working memory. Trials with an incorrect response to 
the memory probe were excluded from further analyses.  
To measure the Ebbinghaus illusion, we computed the probability of choosing 
the target with small inducers, so that a higher score indicates more illusion (apart for 
the first two displays, in which the target with small inducers was indeed larger; see 
Figure 2). These probabilities were entered into a 2 (working memory load: high, low) 
x 8 (large inducers target size: 92%, 96%, 100%, 104%, 108%, 112%, 116%, and 
120%) repeated measures ANOVA, with participants as the random factor. Not 
surprisingly, there was a main effect for large inducers target size (F(2,16) = 55.45, 
MSe = .089, p < .001 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected); Kp2 = .874): the larger the 
target with small inducers was, the more frequently is was chosen. Most important for 
our investigation was a significant main effect for working memory load (F(1,8) = 
6.18, MSe = .019, p < .05; Kp2 = .436). There was more illusion under high working 
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 memory load (mean probability of choosing the target with small inducers = .826), 
compared to low working memory load (mean probability of choosing the target with 
small inducers =.769). The interaction between working memory load and large 
inducers target size was also significant (F(4,28) = 3.06, MSe = .018, p < .05 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected); Kp2 = .277). This was likely due to a ceiling effect 
when the large inducers had a smaller target circle than the small inducers (see Figure 
2).  
=================== 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
=================== 
 
 
We also computed the point of subjective equality (PSE) for each participant 
by linear interpolation, which was the size difference between the two targets at which 
a participant chose each target (i.e., with large inducers and with small inducers) in 
50% of the trials. Analysis of the differences of PSEs from veridicality (large inducers 
target size 100%) revealed that both load conditions produced a highly significant 
illusion (under high load t(8) = 19.45, p < .001; under low load t(8) = 12.61, p < .001). 
Importantly, PSEs were greater under high working memory load compared to low 
load (t(8) = 2.35, SEM = .259, p < .05, Cohen’s d =  .78). On average, the 2.4° target 
with small inducers was seen the same size as a 2.8° target with large inducers under 
high load, and as a 2.7° target with large inducers under low load.  
 Finally, we had to establish that the increased effect under high memory load 
was not due simply to reduced accuracy in size contrast judgments under high load, in 
which case the variance in the size contrast judgments would also be greater under 
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 high compared to low load. Instead, when the between-subjects variance was 
compared between high and low load for each display, with target size as the random 
factor, there was a trend for less between-subjects variance under high load (t(7) = 
2.02, SEM = .013, p = .083). Similarly for the within-subject variance, a 2 (load) x 8 
(large inducers target size) ANOVA on subjects’ standard deviations in each 
condition showed a marginally significant main effect of load, with less variance in 
high versus low load, F(1,8) = 4.81, MSe = .003, p = .06.  
 
Discussion 
 
Observers experienced a stronger Ebbinghaus illusion when they were holding 
a set of six digits in working memory than when a single digit was held in working 
memory. This effect is unlikely due to a general reduction in accuracy in target size 
judgments under high memory load, since this may have led to the same drop in 
accuracy at all target size differences. Instead, whereas for target size differences of 
92%, 96% and 100%, there was no difference whatsoever in size judgments between 
low and high memory load, the amount of illusion was consistently greater for the 
remaining target size differences under high working memory load. More importantly, 
the conclusion that this difference indeed reflects more illusion rather than overall 
poorer performance under high load is supported by the observation that neither 
between-subjects nor within-subjects variance in size contrast judgments were greater 
in high than in low load.  
Overall, the amount of illusion experienced in this study was very large. This 
may in part be because we used relatively large size differences between the target 
and the inducer circles. Previous work has shown that the illusion increases with an 
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 increase in the size difference between test and inducer circles (Massaro & Anderson, 
1971). However, this is unlikely to fully explain the strength of the illusion observed 
here: in a previous Ebbinghaus study, we used configurations in which the size of the 
small inducers was 21% of that of the accompanying target, and the size of the large 
inducers 160% of the average size of the accompanying target (De Fockert, Davidoff, 
Fagot, et al., 2007). In that study, the overall amount of illusion produced by circle 
inducers in an English sample was .13°. In the present study, the size of the small 
inducers was 20% of that of the accompanying target, and the size of the large 
inducers 172% of the average size of the accompanying target, yet we found a level of 
overall illusion of 0.4°. Instead, the strong overall illusion may be due to the dual task 
nature of the experiment, which will have imposed an increased cognitive load in both 
low and high load, leading to greater illusion. Previous work (Lavie et al., 2004) has 
shown that the requirement to switch between tasks also leads to increased distractor 
interference, and the dual task employed here may have produced strong baseline 
levels of Ebbinghaus illusion in both low and high memory load, which were further 
increased when working memory was loaded. 
 These findings are in line with evidence that the amount of Ebbinghaus 
illusion can be modulated by manipulating whether or not inducers are attended 
(Shulman, 1992). When both small and large inducers accompanied a target circle, 
and attention was directed to the large inducers, the target had a smaller apparent size 
than when attention was directed to the small inducers. This suggests that the amount 
of illusion depends on whether or not the inducers receive attention, and we have 
shown that a reduced ability to direct attention away from the inducers under high 
working memory load leads to an increase in the amount of illusion.  
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 These results strongly suggest that increased working memory load during 
selective attention leads to greater perception of irrelevant distractors, rather than 
more response conflict. If high working memory would have made observers more 
confused about responding to a large distractor circle rather than the larger target 
circle, this would have resulted in the opposite effect: seemingly less illusion (because 
the target with the large inducers would be chosen more often) under high working 
memory load. Instead, we found that the Ebbinghaus was greater under high working 
memory load, suggesting that the inducers were perceived better under high working 
memory load, and that perception of the inducers was prevented more successfully 
under low working memory load. Importantly, this increased perception of the 
inducers affected processing of the target circle, and led to more Ebbinghaus illusion. 
In conclusion, we have provided new evidence for the prediction from load 
theory of selective attention that variations in the availability of working memory lead 
to differences in the extent of distractor processing. We have shown this using a 
perceptual size illusion that depends on bottom-up inputs such as the size of the 
inducers (e.g., Rose & Bressan, 2002). Our data does not speak to the precise nature 
of the Ebbinghaus illusion, and there is evidence that the illusion can also depend on 
cognitive factors, such as conceptual similarity between the target and the inducers 
(e.g., Coren & Miller, 1974; Coren & Enns, 1993), and visual marking of the inducers 
(Müller & Busch, 2006). Moreover, the increase in illusion under high memory load 
could reflect, amongst other possibilities, greater inducer processing per se or less 
efficient disengagement from the inducers. From the present data, we cannot 
distinguish between these possibilities, and further work is needed to provide a more 
detailed explanation of how load leads to greater inducer processing in Ebbinghaus 
displays. The findings do, however, support the prediction from load theory that the 
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 efficiency of selective attention in separating processing for task-relevant information 
from processing for task-irrelevant information depends critically on the availability 
of working memory.  
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 Figure captions: 
 
Figure 1: Example of a high working memory load trial. See text for further 
details. 
 
Figure 2: Mean frequency of choosing the target with small inducers, as a 
function of working memory load and large inducers target size. Higher scores 
indicate greater illusion (for large inducer target sizes of 100% and above). Veridical 
equality was at large inducers target size 100%. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. 
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